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This paper examines the evolution of the U, S. Navy's Fleet Hospital
Support System. Various agencies and bureaus within the Department of
the Navy have been attempting to design a suitable, deployable combat
hospital system. Each agency involved with the problem has produced
varying designs for a feasible system. This paper integrates the various
design proposals into one document for purposes of planning, comparison
and coordination. It analyzes the current status of the Fleet Hospital
Program and discusses methods that can be utilized by the planners of
the system to enhance program review and development progress. The paper
concludes with recommendations concerning methods for attaining resolution
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Mercurial fluctuations in the relationships between major world powers,
and events of military or quasi-military actions such as those in Iran,
Afghanistan, and most recently Poland have increased the nation's civilian
and military leaders' interest in the state of combat readiness of the
U. So Armed Forces. A vital part of the overall state of combat readiness
is combat medical readiness.
The wartime medical readiness mission is assigned directly to the
Department of Defense ( DOD) by law (10 U.S.C. 3062, 5012, and 8062), DOD
regulations unambiguously transmit that mission to the Medical Departments
of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Over the past few years there has been
an increasing concern within Congress, DOD, and the services' medical
departments about the capability of the U. S. Military to deliver adequate
combat medical care. [Refo 1]
At the 38th Convention of the Association of Military Surgeons of the
U. S, in November 1981, Doctor John H. Moxley III, Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs during the Carter administration, stated:
"The harsh reality is that if the United States commits forces to
major combatoo.we could not care for a significant portion of our
casualties. We do not have enough deployable hospitals of any kind
to provide even the emergency surgical treatment required to prepare
the predicted numbers for evacuation. Our current lack of assets
puts us in a most awkward position^ In the face of an enemy challenge,
we would have to either forego defense of our national interests or
commit our servicemen to combat without the medical support we have
been able and willing to provide in eyery American war in history." [Ref.2]
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Each military service must define, or arrange for the definition of,
the medical requirements for its individual service. This function for
the Navy has been given to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED),
which is specifically accountable for supplying adequate medical and
health care for Naval personnel. In addition, in times of crisis BUMED
is responsible for proper hospitalization and medical evacuation of not
only Navy personnel but Marine Corps personnel as well, [Ref. 3]
The violence of the modern battlefield, with its ultrasophisticated
weapons, will produce large numbers of casualties in a \jery short time.
[Ref. 4] DOD and the Navy Medical Department have taken various steps
to ensure medical care for the expected high numbers of casualties in a
future contingency. These include: (1) the Pentagon's enlisting as
many civilian hospitals as possible in the vicinity of existing military
hospitals and within relatively short distances from air bases into which
casualties would be flown from abroad and setting aside bed space for
the casualties; (2) pursuing increased resource sharing within DOD and
with the Veterans Administration; (3) the Navy's increasing direct care
productivity with the transfer of physicians from administrative positions
to direct patient care; (4) placing increased emphasis on ensuring that
the health care professionals, from physicians to corpsmen, receive
adequate training to prepare them for their wartime roles; and (5) including
developing of improved methods of preventing and treating casualties in
research and development goals. This last step includes the development




Various agencies and bureaus within the Department of the Navy have
been attempting to design a suitable, deployable, Fleet Hospital Support
System. Each agency or bureau grappling with the problem has produced
varying ideas and schemes for a feasible system. However, the varying
plans have not been incorporated into one summary document for purposes
of comparison, planning and coordination.
It is the purpose of this paper to: (1) Integrate the various design
proposals for the Fleet Hospital Support System into one document;
(2) Present an analysis of the current status of the Fleet Hospital
Support System's development and implementation program; and (3) Present
recommendations for resolution of current and potential problems in the
progress of the Fleet Hospital Support System's development,
C. OVERVIP-J
As originally envisioned. Fleet Hospitals are to be self-contained,
relocatable, and easily transported and erected. When prepositioned in
strategic communications zones (COMiMZ) within the theater of operations
or set up in the rear combat zone, these facilities are to provide
immediate, maximum response in support of combat operations by receiving
casualties from Marine Corps organic medical elements in the combat zone,
or from initial casualty-receiving ships of the amphibious task force--
LHA's, LPD's, LPH's—or from hospital ships operating in the area.
The Department of the Navy conducted two primary Fleet Hospital
Support System studies, A review of the relationship of these studies
in Chapter II includes the Fleet Hospital Management Program that was
established and the program's key logistical considerations.
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The key determinant in the Fleet Hospital Support (FHS) requirements
is the anticipated type of casualty, severity of casualty injury/illness,
and casualty flow. The method used by both Fleet Hospital Support study
groups to generate the anticipated casualty mix is discussed in Chapter III
Transportable hospital systems being used by the other armed services,
and commercial shipping containers that could be modified were considered
for adoption, both separately and in various combinations. Chapter IV is
a summarization of the primary configurations that BUMED considered and
the key characteristics of each of these configurations.
The analysis of the various transportable hospital platforms resulted
in the selection of a combination system for modification, test and
evaluation. This combination system, and the reasons for its selection,
are presented in Chapter V, along with the rationale presented by the
Fleet Hospital Support System planners for non-selection of the other
hospital configurations.
The Fleet Hospital test and evaluation process has disclosed several
critical problem areas that are hampering the implementation of the
Fleet Hospital Support System. Chapter VI highlights the problems
currently encumbering the Fleet Hospital Program, as well as problems
that can be reasonably expected in the future.
This paper concludes with the authors' recommendations for resolving
the pivotal problems the Fleet Hospital Program has encountered, or will
encounter in the later stages of the Fleet Hospital Support Program.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research effort consisted of two separate approaches: (1) A
search was conducted to survey DOD reports, instructions, management
16

guides, and policy statements that were relevant to the topic; and
(2) A number of on-site visits were made to the Fleet Hospital Support
Office (FHSO) in Alameda, California, and to other pertinent agencies/
facilities to acquaint the authors with the Fleet Hospital Support program
and to enable them to conduct interviews with people connected with the
operation.
IK THE FLEET HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT AND LOGISTICS PROGRAM
The Fleet Hospital Program (FHP) concept posed come unique operational
challenges for the Navy. It was recognized at the outset that such an
extensive project would require intensive planning, followed by close and
continual coordination of many separate offices. BUMED also recognized
the Logistics portion of the FHP would present the most critical problems.
(The ultimate success of the Fleet Hospital hinges on the ability to get
it to the contingency COMMZ, erected, and operational in a yery short
time frame. This is clearly not the function of medical personnel for
the most part.)
An Integrated Logistics Support Management Plan (ILSMP) was developed
and published to outline the various responsibilities and interfaces.
The ILSMP was intended to be dynamic and flexible, changing as the FMP
went through the process of program evolution. The following paragraphs
are summarized from the October 1980 revised draft ILSMP,
A. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Management of the Fleet Hospital Support Program at the CNO (Chief of
Naval Operations) level was vested in OPNAV 41, Material Division, and
17

was to be coordinated by 0P41H, The FHSO was given responsibility for
the execution of the program as well as the necessary coordination between
the staffs of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), BUMED,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP), the Commanders-in-Chief (CINC), and the Type Commanders (TYCOMS)
to attain the program objectives. Responsibilities for specific elements



















There was also an extensive list of Navy Medical Consultants generated





Plans were required for the development of corrective or preventive
maintenance procedures for the Fleet Hospitals during construction,
relocation, preposition, and operational phases. Fleet Hospital maintenance




NAVFAC was charged with developing and documenting procedures for
facilities maintenance. These procedures were to be included in the
hospital library of repair manuals. Supervision of the maintenance
functions rests with those normally responsible in accordance with
standard Navy hospital procedures, unless determined otherwise by BUMED,
2. Preposition Maintenance
BUMED was made responsible for preventive and corrective mainten-
ance of all medical equipment, and the hospital in its sustained storage
mode. Plans were to address equipment repair procedures, equipment
monitoring, recordkeeping, asset rotation, and any other appropriate
topic. Applicable inventory managers were to ensure documentation and
procedures for their specific equipment. While BUMED, NAVFAC, and NAVSUP
were given responsibilities in this area, it was intended more to the
development of the actual plans and procedures, with FHSO the responsible
agent for implementation while assets were in the sustained storage mode,
C. SUPPLY
The supply plan referred to spares and repair parts needed for main-
tenance, replacement, and repair of Fleet Hospital medical, facility,
support and transportation equipment. It also included repair parts for
19

Support Equipment. One of the purposes of this plan was to present the
resources and direction necessary to provide adequate supplies of
repair/spare parts, both repairable and consumable, for construction,
storage, relocation and operation.
The Navy-wide, three-level (organizational, intermediate, and depot)
maintenance concept was to remain in effect, ensuring repair parts were
positioned at each designated maintenance level, with the Fleet Hospitals
being authorized only organizational level parts.







Plans were to include provisions for initial, follow-on and subsequent
procurement/utilization of end items. Defense Logistic Support Center
screening was directed to gain DOD-wide visibility of the assets. Consid-
eration was to be given to procuring spares/repair parts with major end
items to take advantage of quantity discounts and minimize contract
modifications. FHSO was to pay particular attention to funding. Past
experience indicated repair parts funding had been less than adequate to
meet the demands of other programs. The long lead time necessary for








D. SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (SE)
SE is equipment required to make an item, system, or facility
operational in its intended environment, and includes all equipment
necessary to maintain, operate, calibrate or test. But this does not
include built-in test equipment integral to the system, item, or facility,
or environmental control equipment.
FHSO was given responsibility for overall management of this portion
of the program, and was required to coordinate the efforts of BUMED,
NAVFAC, and NAVSUP to develop, design, and integrate the SE into the
facilities. Part of this responsibility included establishing the table
of allowances concurrently with those of the medical and facilities
equipment lists.
E. PERSONNEL
BUMED and NAVFAC were given joint responsibility for the development
of medical and consultant personnel requirements and plans. They used
the MEDCON II model modified to account for support services, facility
configuration, and expected resource availability. The staffing figures
provided in Table 1 represent a range of medical/surgical capability for
the minimal 250-bed Fleet Hospital through the maximum 1 ,000-bed Fleet
Hospital. The Fleet Hospital is designed to operate under a variety of
conditions, including fluctuating admission rates. The MEDCON II model
(Medical Contingency Planning Model Phase II) accounts for this in the
different scenario modifications, SUMED was tasked to develop the
complete staffing, including progressive staff mobil ization, ranks and




Staffing Requirements for Fleet Hospitals
Staff Requir ed Bas ed on
Number of Ho spital Beds
Staff Source
250 500 750 1 ,000
Medical Corps 45 70 91 116
Dental Corps 4 5 6 7
Nurse Corps 81 146 215 284
Medical Service Corps 26 33 53 57
JAG Corps 1 2 2 3
Chaplain Corps 2 2 4 3
Civil Engineering Corps 1 2 2 3
Enlisted Ratings*
HM 283 458 644 824
Sea Bee (Occupational Field 13) 99 136 158 178
MA, BM, GM, SH 269 331 418 496
TOTAL 812 185 603 1 ,971
* 25% will be senior enlisted rates.
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There was also a requirement to plan for the personnel to maintain
the hospital while in its storage mode at the prepositioned site. If
these personnel were to be civilian/contract personnel, they would
require the same relative skills/grades as military personnel. If they
were to be military, they could also serve as part of the core construction
element, and provide liaison between the medical elements and the
construction battalion or unit that erects the hospital. These personnel
requirements are shown in Table 2.
It was planned that the prepositioned maintenance crew would begin
initial implementation of the break-out phase on notice of mobilization.
Upon arrival of a Naval Construction Force, the prepositioned crew would
revert to the liaison role until arrival of the Commanding Officer of
the hospital and advance party. The Advance Party Hospital Staff would
include personnel as follows:
Commanding Officer
Director, Administrative Services












Prepositioned Hospital Maintenance Detachment Personnel Requirements
Personnel
Staff Required Based on
Number of Hospital Beds































































NAVFAC was charged with identifying construction personnel to erect
the hospitals and the personnel required on the hospital staffs for
facilities operations and maintenance, CNO, Fleet CINC's, and BUMED
were to designate the activities and personnel who would provide the
construction and operational capabilities.
Since most of the military medical personnel trained for combat
medicine are assigned to Continental United States (CONUS) medical
facilities, initial staffing was to be planned using a draw-down of
these facilities, followed by immediate deployment. This placed BUMED
in the position of redesigning contingency medical mobilization plans
in finite detail
,
The skills and knowledge required to construct, relocate, operate,
and maintain a Fleet Hospital are within the scope of existing ratings,
so there is not a requirement to revise qualifications.
F. TRAINING
1 o Medical Procedures
The medical staff consists of those personnel directly providing
patient care. These personnel were to be selected from BUMED activities
25

and indoctrinated into their mobilization role. No specialized training
was considered necessary beyond this, except for a few designated
specialties. BUMED would coordinate the information on current combat
operating environments with Navy Health Science Education and Training
Commands (NHSETC), who would ensure combat medicine training programs
remain consistent with the proposed scenario(s).
2. Maintenance Personnel
BUMED was required to ensure appropriate training courses/manuals
are developed to instruct biomedical engineers in the maintenance of
medical equipment of Fleet Hospitals, in both the operational and sus-
tained storage modes. NAVFAC was to perform the same function for
facilities maintenance,
3. Hospital Construction/Operations
For the majority of the personnel, it was anticipated hospital
construction/operation training would consist of an indoctrination in
the Fleet Hospital concept and their particular role in the event of
mobilization. Such an indoctrination program was to be provided each
command for inclusion as part of the in-service training program.
A core of advance party personnel were to receive special hands-on
training structured by BUMED, This would include training in all aspects
of erection, operation, and maintenance of the hospital. Each of the
several hospitals would be represented with different core parties.
G. TECHNICAL LOGISTIC DATA (TLD)
TLD relates to the preparation of technical documentation necessary
to install, maintain, and operate the shelter components and medical/
26

non-medical equipment that comprise a Fleet Hospital. It does not
address provisioning technical documentation or medical procedures,
1 . Facilities and Non-medical Equipment
When a Fleet Hospital is in operation, the technical manuals or
other data pertaining to the maintenance and use of facilities components,
utilities hardware, and other non-medical equipment will be controlled by
the Shops Branch of the Public Works Service section. NAVFAC was made
responsible for determining the need for manuals covering this subject,
but each applicable inventory manager would develop the manuals not
related to facilities components or utilities hardware.
2. Storage Support Equipment
NAVSUP was to develop procedures for the prepositioning, to
include the provision of support equipment necessary to maintain and
monitor a specified degree of environmental control. This also entailed
ensuring the technical manuals were developed for operating and maintaining
such support equipment.
3. Medical Equipment
When in the operational mode, the Medical Equipment Maintenance
and Repair Branch will control technical manuals or other data relating
to the maintenance and use of all medical equipment within the Fleet
Hospital. S'JMED was to be responsible for determining the need for any
such manuals related to medical equipment,
H. FACILITIES
The operational concepts and overall design requirements were to come
from BUMED. NAVFAC was to provide the detailed design development and
27

facilities configuration efforts, including facility and Civil Engineering
Support Equipment (CESE) procurement and assembly sepci fications.
1 , Facility Configuration
NAVFAC is developing the overall hospital configuration on a
functional basis to meet the operational concepts and medical requirements
of BUMED. The functions to be provided and the patient flow/configurations
are subject to change based on Test and Evaluation results. While each
hospital may be individually configured for its scenario, a type-
configuration will be used for core requirements.
2. Specific Shelter Selection
BUMED established the program objectives and defined the scope
of design for definitive care, self-contained, transportable, rapidly
erectable medical and base support facilities. The design effort was
done by NAVFAC, which initially included identifying recommended trans-
portable hospital shelters, supporting facilities, transportation
equipment, utilities, a site plan, and a budget estimation. They
subsequently contacted over 50 building and shelter manufacturers to
evaluate products already on the market or in development. From this
intensive search, NAVFAC selected the principal recommended shelters to
be tested. They were:
ISO 7:1, 3:1, 2:1 expandable shelter/containers
ISO rigid, complexible container/shelters
Knockdown portable complexible shelters




The initial design configuration concentrated on the core area
of the hospital, the area corresponding to essential medical functions,
excluding non-intensive/recovery care.
3. Shelter/Equipment Interface
Each shelter in the Fleet Hospital has to be compatible with the
construction and transportation handling equipment, supporting utility
hardware, and the medical equipment to be utilized in the shelter. NAVFAC
was held responsible for handling equipment and utility hardware con-
straints, BUMED for ensuring compatibility with corresponding medical
equipment and procedures. BUMED was made final authority for all interior
design and shelter configurations for operational/medical requirements.
4. Construction/Dismantl ing Procedures
BUMED medical equipment specialists were to develop and document
the procedures for assembling and positioning the facilities, connecting
the utility hardware, and unpacking and assembling the interior medical
equipment. These procedures would be evaluated during the Test and
Evaluation phases of the FHP. FHSO was responsible for identifying
facility requirements to install the hospital in its sustained storage
site at forward deployment locations. FHSO would then notify the
responsible Fleet CINC and assist in the initiation of additional
construction projects when necessary. NAVFAC would also assist in
planning and constructing in these instances.
I. PACKAGING, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND TRANSPORTATION (PHST)
PHST are the functions that determine the relocatabil ity, erection
time, and operational readiness of the Fleet Hospital, Maximum use of
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intermodal ISO containers with contents grouped according to hospital
functions is viewed as the key to success of the total concept. The
containers, after expansion, serve as operating rooms and other spaces
necessary for definitive health care.
1 o Packaging
It was directed that the Fleet Hospital would be packaged to the
maximum extent possible in multi-purpose ISO-configured containers to
reduce the need for normal packaging materials, minimize the gross weight
of containers plus contents, minimize the number of personnel, amount
of time, and skills required to ship, store, and erect the hospital,
FHSO would determine maximum gross weights for helicopter trans-
portability o NAVSUP would develop the procedures manuals for storage
and transportation, which were to include equipment/supplies location,
loading plans for each container, weights, cubes, and all information
needed by construction, maintenance, and hospital personnel to efficiently
transport, store, and relocate the hospital. Determination of package
design trade-offs, levels of protection, packaging costs, and other
packaging requirements was the responsibility of NAVSUP, but all
deviations/alterations required FHSO approval.
2, Hand! ing
Handling refers to the provisions built into each container to
permit tne most efficient manipulation during operation, storage, trans-
portation, and erectiono It also includes the materials handling
equipment. In generg-l , handling provisions included forklift pockets,
corner fittings, skids, dimensions, ratings, and standards that enable
a container to be moved, tied down, stored, stacked, erected, and
30

intermodally manipulated with commonly available and used equipment. It
was determined ISO or American Standards Institute (AMSI) standards would
be used exclusively unless determined otherwise by FHSO, or the needs of
the Defense Transportation System (DTS), FHSO was encouraged to coordinate
with NAVSUP or other knowledgeable persons in the DTS to ensure appropriate
handling characteristics.
3. Storage
The Fleet Hospitals are intended for storage as final account
material for extended periods. Security items, those requiring special
storage, and items with a shelf life of less than five years are to be
coded as Prepositioned Reserve Material Requirements (PWRMR) for funding
and retention as normal Navy Stock Funded items. Since the hospital is
designed for three distinct groupings (core, medical support, and base
support), storage considerations were to incorporate those functional
groupings for ease of breakout. Storage/packaging trade-offs were to
also be considered, e.g., a higher level of packaging to permit outside
storage, or lower level of packaging where inside storage will be
availablCo Funding was expected to be the key criteria for this type of
decision. FHSO was to have overall responsibility for all storage
requirements and procedures, and was to use the least-cost option
wherever possible.
4, Transportation
Transportation of the Fleet Hospital components to an assembly
area would be the responsibility of component contractors, NAVSUP would
be responsible for military-owned items, as well as second destination
transportation for all items. Once erected, organic transportation would
31

be the responsibility of base support. FHSO was to be the overall
coordinator of transportation methods and schedules. OPNAV was to develop
the transportation methodology for wartime requirements.
J. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (MIS)
The requirement to manage internal data is organic to all hospitals.
It is the flow of management information that will determine the effec-
tiveness of administrative coordination. It includes both the patient




BUMED would have responsibility for determining the requirements
for administrative recording of patient medical information. Responsibility
for supply data information identification will be shared, BUMED having
responsibility for medical equipment and supplies, NAVSUP having facilities
components and utilities hardware, and NAVFAC having all others. FHSO
would coordinate these efforts.
2. Processing Information
BUMED was to have responsibility for recommending the procedures
used to accomplish the necessary data flow. Then in the operational mode,
medical records would be controlled by the Medical Records Processing
Division and the Medical Information Services Division, both of which are
in the Patient Affairs Services Division. Supply and maintenance records
were to be controlled by the Supply Division for medical equipment and
all supplies, and by the Public Works Division for all non-medical
equipment. BUMED, in conjunction with the Naval Medical Data Services
Center, was to coordinate the development of all data processing systems




OPNAV 41 retained overall responsibility for the preparation and
submission of budget requests. FHSO was tasked to ensure all elements
of the PHP were considered in the funding process, and were required to
submit a life-cycle cost plan (LCC) addressing developmental, acquisition,
PHST, labor, and maintenance costs. Dollar amounts were established
for Other Procurement Navy (OPN), Navy Stock Fund (NSF) and Operation
and Maintenance, Navy (OM&N) categories. Specific activities were
allocated responsibilities for portions of the budget as follows:
Program Operations
Facil ities and CESE

















Each hospital was to be assigned a Unit Identification Code (UIC)
number. A Coordinated Shorebased Allowance List (COSBAL) would be
prepared by Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) for each hospital based
on the table of allowances. The COSBAL would contain the appropriate
documentation for inventory control and reporting purposes. The main-
tenance unit located at each hospital storage site, or preposition site.
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would be responsible for unit readiness, reporting directly to FHSO,
who has overall inventory management responsibility.
FHSO, assisted by BUMED, NAVFAC, NAVSUP, and the CINC's where
feasible, will rotate the assets to meet operational requirements and
avoid asset obsolescence while in storage. BUMED procurement funds will
be used to replace Fleet Hospital assets in this rotation process.
M. ACQUISITION
In an effort to manage the many staff elements and interfaces involved
in acquisition, an Acquisition Management Team (AMT) was formed, composed




Medical Equipment Acquisition BUMED
Medical Equipment Technical Review BUMED




The FHSO, with the advice and assistance of the AMT, would take
action to ensure adequate program and hospital design definition, test
and evaluate these designs, arrange necessary contracts, plan and schedule




The design criteria served two purposes. First, they provided the
basis from which to judge the alternative designs considered for selection,
and second, they provided the criteria to use in modifying the selected
system to meet the exacting requirements of a definitive care facility.
Not all-inclusive, they did give the necessary shelter design characteristics
that were considered most essential.
1 . Exterior
a. Rigid walls, ceilings, floors and doors
b. Interconnectable
c. Built-in leveling jacks for both leveling and elevation
do Insulated to protect from exterior temperature range of
-30° to 120° F
e. Leakproof and corrosion resistant
f. Wind load and snow load resistant
g. ISO configured and movable by standard DOD equipment
h. Ramps facilitating roll -over entrances
i. Repairable exterior shell
j. Easily and quickly erectable
2. Interior
a. Reflective interior panels
b. Resistant to scratches, impacts, moisture, wear, stain, chips
or effects of environmental changes
c. Height at least eight feet




f. Floors supportable of required equipment loads
g. Minimal floor interruptions
3. Utilities - Air
a. Forced air for heat and air conditioning
b. 50-55 per cent humidity controlled (DESIGNATED AREAS ONLY)
c. Ducted air distribution (heating six to eight inches off
floor, air conditioning 12 to 18 inches from ceiling)
d. No hot/cold spots
e. Positive pressure
f. Back-up units available
g. Standard stock with adaptation
h. Accurate temperature control
1, Filtered air - HEPA (Hospital Environment Filtering Apparatus)
99.9 per cent desired, 30 per cent acceptable
j. No fumes or pollution
k. Minimum 12 room changes per hour (25 desired)
1. Make-up air - at least 20 per cent (variable fresh air)
m. Ventilation must be emergency powered
4. Utilities - Electrical
a. Lighting - 50 to 200 foot candles, with emergency battery
pack, variable depending on shelter function
b. Gas scavenger system for anesthesia apparatus in OR's
c. Hospital grade U-ground receptacles
d. Three wire grounded system, in conduits

e. Cluster receptacles, various locations as specified
f. Isolation transformers, located as specified
g. Emergency power automatically commences within ten seconds
of normal power loss
h. 120 volts, 60-cycle throughout, except where specified
5. Utilities - General
a. Built-in vacuum, oxygen, NOo, compressed air systems in
specified areas
b. Piped potable water to specified areas
c. Central system for sterilization
d. Internal communications as specified
0. MILESTONE TABLES
An exhaustive list was composed of the milestones for the FHP, which
included the events, responsible agency, and date by which it was due to
be completed. The authors consider the Milestone Table a critical part
of the FHP and this paper, and have included it from the October, 1980
ILSMP in its entirety as Table 3.
P. TEST AND EVALUATION
Each hospital procured will be assembled at the packaging and preser-
vation site in CONUS prior to shipment. Presently, the FHSO is involved
in testing and evaluating the prototype core facility, along with selected
medical support portions. The prototype shelters were procured and
modified to accept the specific end items of medical equipment necessary
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facility. This project took place at Port Hueneme, California, and
required an extensive and painstaking effort by Navy Construction Batta-
lion personnel, as well as medical and NAVFAC representatives. The FHSO
found itself, with no previous experience, coordinating a myriad of
technical construction, engineering, electrical, plumbing, transportation,
and medical problems among individuals with virtual ly no background or
understanding of each others' fields of expertise. The FHSO film that
documents this operation touches only lightly on the true impact of the
situation, but makes it easy enough to correlate their experience to
the Biblical account of the building of the Tower of Babel, for in truth,
these people all talked a special language.
After completing the necessary modifications and equipment installa-
tions, the core facility, or parts of it were transported to the Marine
Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, for desert
climate testing in the Summer of 1980. It was subsequently transported
to the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport,
California, in the Winter of 1980-81, for winter weather testing. The
results of these tests, as well as a look to the future of the PriP will
be covered in the next chapter. Chapter III.
Q. SUMMARY
The FHP has been a massive undertaking. It may be without parallel
in complexity and size as far as BUMED is concerned. There are so many
different agencies involved, each with their own special problems. As
with all large programs, slippages and cost-overruns are inevitable, and
it becomes difficult to maintain sight of the central thread that created
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the program initially. There has been a lot of ground-work to keep this
program on track, with responsibilities clearly delineated down to user
level. This chapter has been devoted to establishing a picture of those
responsibilities and to clarifying the key players assigned critical
roles in the development of the Navy Fleet Hospital Support System.
III. ESTABLISHING THE CONTINGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
Shortfalls in the United States Navy and Marine Corps medical support
capabilities afloat were identified in 1968. As early as 1971, alternative
concepts were being proposed to eliminate or reduce these shortfalls,
primarily in consideration of building new hospital ships, or converting
existing hulls to a dedicated hospital ship role. These alternatives
were considered to be too costly at an early date, and were eliminated
from serious consideration. In early 1977, the Chief of Naval Operations
directed that a feasibility study be conducted of alternatives to
dedicated hospital ships (ADHOS), which was to examine all alternatives
to a dedicated, full-time hospital ship. Following a logical process,
the ADHOS Committee first sought to determine the degree of medical
support required by examining potential casualty flow. This process
utilized specific planning factors which were: 1) The contingency
scenario; 2) The medical support goals; 3) The evacuation policy;
4) The casualty flow; 5) The patient arrival rate; 5) The percentage
of surgical patients; and 7) The length of patient stay. Each of




The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) publish scenarios of possible military
conflicts, ranging from limited police action to full-scale, unlimited
war. These scenarios not only describe the degree of involvement, but
also address geographical locale. The ADHOS selected a contingency
scenario reflecting their estimate of the most versatile and plausible
range of casualty probabilities. From the Navy perspective, the selected
scenario contained both sea-based as well as amphibious assault operations-
important considerations for an analysis of normal Navy/Marine situations.
[Ref. 7]
B. THE MEDICAL SUPPORT GOALS
The broad goals of the Navy medical department were listed as the
prevention of loss of life and either the full restoration of the indivi-
dual to health, or the minimization of the resultant disability as a
result of injury or disease. The ADHOS study further clarified the
following descriptions of care to be expected during combat or contingency
operations. [Ref. 8]
1 . Emergency Care
The medical attention at the site of the occurrence of the injury
by whomever is present
—
usually entailing control of bleeding, splinting,
bandaging, pain relief, and evacuation, falls within this category. From
the medical support side, this assistance is usually rendered by Navy




Lifesaving care is that medical care designed to reverse or cause
the cessation of threat to life, e.g., blood, or intravenous fluid
replacement, establishment and preservation of airways, and the removal
of dead and decomposing tissue,
3. Definitive Care
Definitive care is defined as any treatment, including surgery,
e.g., neurosurgery/thoracic surgery, and other accepted procedures, e.g.,
physical therapy/administration of disease specific medication to fully
restore the patient to health or to minimize the disability that might
result from a particular injury. Providing definitive care presupposes
a hospital setting with the required specialized diagnostic and therapeutic
equipment.
Emergency and lifesaving treatment are covered by Navy hospital
corpsmen, either at the site of the injury or illness, or at nearby
battle aid stations and aboard ship. However, the definitive care
facilities (DCF) do not exist in the Navy medical system as they did
during the overt hostilities in the past. It is this lack of DCF's that
generated the need for feasibility studies.
C. EVACUATION POLICY
Planning for overseas conflicts includes assumptions about the
proportion of the sick and wounded to be returned to the United States
for treatmento These assumptions are expressed as evacuation policy.
Evacuation policy is a management tool used to regulate patient buildup
and flow through the medical support system during wartime operations.
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The JCS determines the evacuation policy for the area of operation.
It ranges from 1 5 to 60 days, and those patients who can be fully treated
and returned to duty within the allotted time frame would remain in the
COMMZ. Those who are diagnosed as needing treatment in excess of this time
frame are medically stabilized and evacuated from the COMMZ as soon as it
is possible, to provide more room and access to medical resources for
those patients remaining. The ADHOS Committee analyzed the impact of
both the 15 and 60 day evacuation policies. Using the information from
the extremes, it becomes merely a mathematical manipulation to extrapolate
requirements for evacuation policies that fall within this range. [Ref, 9]
Do CASUALTY FLOW
Casualty flow is defined as the method or pattern by which each
individual patient would be routed through the medical support system.
Once becoming wounded in action (WIAl, or incurring a disease/non-battle
injury (DNBI), the individual would be processed through the medical
support system according to the degree of severity of injury or disease.
Initial treatment would take place at the site of the injury, and a
determination would be made of the next level of care if further treatment
is required. Most would be rated through the organic medical stations
of the amphibious task force (ATF)/Marine Corps unit, but some could be
sent directly to a DCF within the COMMZ. This DCF would probably be Navy,
but other branches of the Armed Forces, as well as Host Nations' medical
facilities could receive the patient. The patients would remain at the
DCF until fully recovered if they are determined returnable to duty within
the parameters of the established evacuation policy. If it appears that
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their injuries will take longer to treat than allowed by the evacuation
policy, they would be evacuated to the United States, or to other DCF's
outside the COMMZ. Patients can be treated and returned to duty at any
of these treatment levels/options. Figure 1 depicts this patient flow,
taken from the ADHOS report. Figure 1 does not address the disposition
of all patients, for some will not survive their injuries or diseases.
Deaths are addressed in the facilities requirements, however.
E. PATIENT ARRIVAL RATE
In the contingency scenario selected for planning purposes by the
ADHOS Committee, it was assumed that the arrival of patients at the DCF's
would be uneven, ranging from 50 to 200 per day within the scope of the
scenario. The most probable transport mode would be rotary-wing aircraft,
but other intra-theater modes, such as fixed-wing aircraft and surface
transport were also anticipated for planning purposes. The geographical
area plays a determining role in mode availability and utility. It was
acknowledged that patients would arrive day and night. Arrival projections
were divided by the 24 hours in a day to simplify the management of the data
F. SURGICAL PATIENTS
The ADHOS selected scenario further anticipates approximately 50 per
cent of the arrivals at the DCF to be surgical patients, with 25 per cent
of these requiring the services of a major operating room, and the other
75 per cent needing only a surgical treatment room. Maximum length of
delay from the infliction of a wound until surgery was established as
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followed by 72 hours in the intensive care unit. The patients treated
in the surgical treatment room would only need time to recover from the
effects of the anesthesia before being returned to the regular medical
wards.
G. LENGTH OF STAY
The expected average length of stay for surgical patients was deter-
mined to be eight days with the 15-day evacuation policy, and 25 days
with the 60-day evacuation policy. Non-surgical patients would stay
seven days under the 15-day evacuation policy, and approximately 12 days
with the 60-day policy. The ADHOS Committee also projected 80 per cent
of the surgical cases would be evacuated under the 15-day criterion.
Under the 60-day evacuation policy, 44 per cent of the surgical cases
would be evacuated, and 10 per cent of the non-surgical cases would be
evacuated. These figures were used by the ADHOS Committee in establishing
the size and composition of any DCF alternative. Based upon such casualty
data and their professional judgement, the ADHOS Committee determined
the number of operating rooms that would be required to be four, seven
and ten— for daily admission rates of 50, 100, and 200, respectively.
The ADHOS study was conducted to determine a long-range solution to
the Navy's medical support needs and did not respond to the immediate
contingency medical supports requirements. In an attempt to determine
the short term contingency requirements, BUMED drafted a Navy Decision
Coordinating Paper (NDCP) describing the critical need for a deployable
Fleet Hospital Support System. This draft appeared for discussion and
coordination in later 1978. The NDCP addressed mainly the European
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scenario, due to the high priority the JCS was placing on improving
in-theater medical capability. [Ref. 10]
In the NDCP, a computerized mathematical simulation of patient flow
throughout the medical support system was used. This model was called
the Medical Contingency Planning Model Phase II (MEDCON II), and analyzed
data from casualty admissions to the Advanced Base Functional Component
(ABFC), Da Nang, Republic of South Viet Nam. The patient statistics
utilized for the ADHOS study were derived from experience in the Korean
theater. Any discussion of the relevance of past casualty data is
problematic. Weapons systems, the environment in which they are used,
and the tactics employed change with time, and therefore so do the
subsequent casualties. While it is easy enough to argue that both the
ADHOS study and the NDCP utilized "cold" data to determine modern-day
contingency medical support requirements, they do provide a starting
point from which to develop future requirements, and are viewed in that
light by the Fleet Hospital Support System planners, rather than as a
definitive/exhaustive projection of future reality.
H. SUMMARY
The key determinant in establishing Fleet Hospital Support requirements
is the anticipated casualty severity and the number of casualties in
the medical support system flow. This chapter discussed the general
methods utilized by both the ADHOS study and the NDCP to generate data to
be considered in planning a Fleet Hospital Support System that would be
suitable in terms of flexibility and deployabil ity in future wartime
scenarios. The next chapter summarizes the various deployable hospital
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systems considered by the Fleet Hospital Support System planners, and
the key characteristics of each of these configurations.
IV. ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Five alternative medical support systems were considered by BUMED to
determine if any of them (or a combination of two or more) could be used
to deliver the surgical and medical care needs of Navy and Fleet Marine
Force (FMF) personnel in a modern-day warfare contingency. The five
alternative systems considered were: 1) The Advanced Base Functional
Component System (ABFC); 2) The Medical Unit, Sel f-Contained Transportable
(MUST); 3) The Marine Corps Environment-Controlled Medical System
(MCEMS); 4) The Modular Air Transportable Hospital (MATH); and 5) The
New Fleet Hospital Support System. Following is a description of each
of these systems.
A. ADVANCED BASE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT SYSTEM (ABFC)
The ABFC system identifies facility requirements for support at
advanced bases. It includes personnel, material, and equipment needed
to deliver surgical and medical care at an advanced base. In the system,
as presently designed, ABFCs will not be preassembled and held in stock
for issue upon request. Although war reserve requirements for individual
ABFCs are specified in the Navy's Support and Mobilization Plans (which
have been developed from Fleet Commanders-in-Chief Operation Plans) few




The ABFC system identifies the medical and dental requirements of
current operations plans scenarios.
B. MEDICAL UNIT SELF-CONTAINED TRANSPORTABLE (MUST)
The MUST is a modular hardware system which was developed and
utilized by the Army, and is designed to provide hospitals for use in
combat zones. The MUST modules consist of a series of functional elements
separately identified as the power unit and the medical equipment sets
(such as surgical; sterile preparation; oral surgery; radiology;
clinical laboratory; pharmacy; ward; emergency treatment; patient
admission; ear, nose and throat; orthopedic; eye examination and
refraction; and supply). The components of each medical equipment set
can be shipped in expandable shelters or included in a multipurpose
shelter combined with an inflatable shelter.
The entire MUST and associated nonmedical equipment sets are self-
sufficient except for fuel and potable water. Construction of expandable
and multipurpose shelters is of lightweight materials such as aluminum-
faced, foam-filled honeycomb panels. Inflatable shelters are constructed
of rubber and fabric with dual walls and inner bladder. A variety of
hospital configurations can be assembled to meet the needs of a particular
combat area. Following is a description of the units and sets.
1. Power Unit/Utilitv Pack
The power unit/utility pack is composed of a multifuel gas turbine
engine unit that drives 10 and 90 kilowatt, alternating current generators
for electrical power. The unit also provides heating, cooling, water




The expandable shelter is a rigid-paneled unit which can be
unfolded from 100 to 245 square feet for space to be used as an operating
room, central material service, laboratory, X-ray, pharmacy, or other
similar hospital functional area. The shelter is equipped with ducts
for air conditioning, an electrical power distribution system, and
provisions for other utility systems. The materials and equipment
required for use in each shelter are designed to be packed within the
folded shelter during storage and transit.
3. Inflatable Shelter
The inflatable shelter, a dual-walled fabric structure, is
formed by air pressure into a shape similar to a Quonset hut. Each
shelter has 1,160 square feet of internal floor space and consists of
one corridor connector, four 13 foot sections, and two end panels.
Standard 13 foot sections are for additional space. The shelter is
used for such functions as wards; patient admission; emergency treat-
ment; orthopedics; ear, nose and throat treatment; eye examination
and refraction; and medical supply. The shelter is equipped with ducts
for air conditioning and for distribution of electricity,
4. Multipurpose Shelter
The multipurpose shelter is a rigid-paneled, metal unit that can
be expanded on one side from 34 to 120 square feet and is enclosed by
insulated fabric panels. In the nonexpanded mode, it is used as a
shipping container for the inflatable shelter and related materials. The




5. Auxiliary Equipment and Supplies
Air-lock chambers and corridors protect entrances and passages
between hospital components. These are constructed of fabric supported
by metal tubing and air-inflated tubes. Fuel, water, food service
sanitation, and transportation provisions may be packed and stored with
the hospital components, or may be obtained from external sources.
C. MARINE CORPS ENVIRONMENT-CONTROLLED MEDICAL SYSTEMS (MCEf^)
In May 1977 the Marine Corps established a required capability for
an environment-controlled medical system to replace the system of tents
and equipment used by field medical units at the time and to provide
for physiological stability of casualties in any environment—whether
hot, cold, wet, dry, or windy.
Functionally oriented elements of the system require that all
equipment be permanently installed, wherever possible, in shelters of
the Marine Corps Expeditionary Shelter System (MCESS). These shelters
would also serve as shipping containers to permit rapid response to
changing tactical, environmental, and geographic situations. Stressed
in the design was the maximum use of standard equipment (e.g., heating
and cooling units for environmental control, electrical power generators,
and water distribution systems). Ground mobility for the system would
be provided for by the standard M-127 trailer or one developed in
conjunction with the MCESS,
The MCEMS is planned for use by medical companies and the hospital




1 . Operational and Organizational Concepts
The system was planned for compatibility with Marine Corps
operational and organizational concepts. Functionally oriented systf
elements would allow for a building-block concept that would increase
flexibility and would enhance task organization of medical support for
given operations. However weights and cubes of embarkation loads would
have to be increased if this concept were used, and material handling
support from other organizations would be required to load and unload
the system components. The helicopter transportability requirement
imposes a restriction of 10,000 pounds gross weight on individual shelter
loads.
2. System Characteristics
Components are housed in a combination of rigid and knockdown
shelters of the MDESS. Sample requirements for numbers of shelters per
component are listed as follows:
Component Rigid RPCS *
Surgery 1 1
Intensive Care 1 9
Laboratory/pharmacy 2 1
Central Sterile Room 1 1
* Relocatable Panelized Complexible Shelters.
D, MODULAR TRANSPORTABLE HOSPITAL (MATH)
The MATH is a mobile hospital system developed for the Air Force by
the Brunswich Corporation. It consists of a 16 bed facility designed
for transport by C-130 airlift. It is intended for support of a forward-
based air detachment for short periods,
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E. NEW FLEET HOSPITAL SUPPORT CONFIGURATION
As an alternative to the first four systems evaluated (ABFC, MUST,
MCEMS, and MATH), BUMED sponsored a feasibility study on configuring a
new hospital system that would have greater flexibility in terms of
being more adaptable to the Navy's operational requirements. After
program objectives were determined, a design for definitive care,
self-contained, transportable, and rapidly erectable medical and base
support was defined. The Civil Engineering Support Office (CESO), Port
Hueneme, California, developed the design as defined by BUMED under the
direction and support of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Washington, D.C.
CESO's design development plan included recommended transportable
hospital shelters and supporting facilities, transportation equipment,
utilities, budget estimates, and plans for a site to set-up and test a
prototype. More than 50 building and shelter manufacturers were contacted
and their products evaluated by CESO in terms of suitability in the Fleet
Hospital concept as defined by BUMED. Each manufacturer's system was
analyzed concerning the manufacturer's previous experience in the
production of International Standardized Organization (ISO) relocatable
container-shelters, shipping, erection time, relocatabil ity, and costs.
As a result of this evaluation, the following shelter systems were
recommended
:
(1) ISO 2:1 and 3:1 expandable container-shelters. Pre-equipped
units utilizing the shipping containers themselves for the shelter
upon arrival at erection destination,
(2) ISO rigid, nonexpandable container-she! terSo
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(3) Relocatable panel ized complexible shelters (RPCS),
(4) Jamesway fabric shelters.
(5) Tent, Extendable Modular Personnel (TEMPER). This tent was
developed by the Army Research Laboratory at Natick, Massachusetts.
The medical core area of the hospital (that area of the hospital used
for essential functions, excluding non-intensive recovery care) was
judged to be most suitably housed in the following type shelters:
Shelter Function
ISO 2:1 Laboratory/Blood Bank, Pharmacy






Operating Room Preparation and Holding Room
Intensive Care Units
Intensive Care Recovery Room
Main Pharmacy
The medical support and base support areas would be housed mostly in
TEMPER fabric shelters or in shelters of similar price and construction.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter identified and described various alternative medical
support systems considered by BUMED, NAVFAC, and CESO before actually
building and testing a prototype Fleet Hospital. In the next chapter,
the rationale of the Fleet Hospital Support System developers for
selecting the system adopted for testing and evaluation is discussed.
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V, RATIONALE FOR ALTERNATIVE SELECTED
A detailed appraisal and study of each of the systems described in
Chapter III as alternatives was conducted to determine which system or
combination of systems would most optimally fulfill Navy operational
readiness, medical support requirements. Factors considered in the
evaluation of each system were logistics, technology, utility, flexibility,
feasibility of production, storage, transportability, relocatabil ity, and
erectabil ity. Following are the evaluations of each system as described
by the NDCP, [Ref. 11]
A. NEW CONFIGURATION
The FHS planners concluded that no single shelter type was sufficient
nor suitable for all purposes in the Fleet Hospital. Since the systems
examined could not satisfy time restrictions or simply were not designed
for (or convertible to) the Navy's requirements, a new configuration for
the Fleet Hospital was considered the most feasible of the alternatives
available.
The new configuration consists of a mix of shelters. ISO containers
(8' X 8' X 20' "boxed") are considered to be ideally suitable for the
operating rooms. These expandable ISO containers offer the option of
shipping at least part of the surgical suite equipment in the "box" during
transit. Upon arrival at its destination it can then be erected and
suitably set up with a minimum of time and effort.
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The receiving wards, recovery rooms, and intensive care units require
large, open spaces for maximum utility. These structures are in the form
of knocked-down flat and rapidly erected on site panels.
Since cost considerations precluded the acquisition of containers or
panel ized structures for the entire hospital, a form of ward-tent was
necessary. What was required was not a tent in the traditional sense, but
a tent with a lightweight frame that would allow for unobstructed open
space inside. The tent should feature high side walls with a greatly
reduced slope, windows, rigid door frames, and above all, the tent should
have a firm plywood floor to permit the use of gurneys and other wheeled
carriages. As noted in Chapter IV, the Army's TEMPER tent was ideally
suited for these structures.
Four different sizes of Fleet Hospitals were considered. Sizes are:
250-bed, 500-bed, 750-bed, and 1000-bed. The size utilized at any one
time will be determined by the scenario of any particular contingency.
Tables four through seven present the predicted packaging, handling,
storage, and transportation costs of each size hospital. Each hospital
consists of three elements: the medical/surgical core, medical support,
and base support. Tables four through seven also break down the predicted
costs of each sized hospital by element.
Rationale is provided for the Fleet Hospital planners' choice of a
new configuration versus the other existing systems--ABFC, MUST, MCEi-IS,
and the MATH. The new configuration consists of ISO containers, collap-
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B, ADVANCED BASE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT SYSTEM
All components (medical, dental, and support) in the ABFC system were
considered to be outdated, and from a technical standpoint alone, not
suited to the proposed system.
The medical and dental components are not intended for rapidly deploy-
able, expeditionary facilities. They are intended to provide modern,
clinically acceptable, facilities if adequate lead time is available to
procure, transport, and erect the buildings, to install needed equipment,
and to deliver supplies. However, the contingency time constraints
imposed by current Operation Plans (OPLANS) will not be met by the ABFC
system. [Ref, 12] Even if the facilities were procured and held in
inventory, the 1000 and 750 bed facilities would require two months for
erection by a construction battalion. The entire processes of procurement,
assembly, shipping, and construction would require a year or more
—
hardly
satisfactory in meeting modern-day contingency requirements.
C. MEDICAL UNIT SELF-CONTAINED TRANSPORTABLE
An analysis of the configuration and engineering designs of the shelters
in the MUST system demonstrated that they were also inadequate. The program
planners considered the problems to be mostly logistics related, and they
were summarized in the NDCP as follows:
(1) Most of the existing Navy medical equipment presently operates on
60-Hertz (Hz) power. Although the utility pack of the MUST system
will generate a limited amount of 50-Hz power, much of the major
medical equipment in the MUST requires 400-Hz power for operation.
If the Navy adopted the MUST system, an extensive modification
program would be required to convert present Navy medical equipment
to the must's unique configuration. This undertaking would be
unacceptably costly and time consuming.
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(2) The operating room was too small.
(3) The uniqueness of the MUST system would result in higher shelter
costs.
(4) The expandable shelters did not meet ISO standards which would be
critical when airlift capability is restricted and containerships
must be relied on for transport,
(5) Although the heating unit delivered heat to each appropriate unit,
air distribution within many of the shelters was inadequate.
(6) The overhead areas of some of the shelters was hindered by a large
connecting beam and precludes ISO configuration.
(7) Fiberglass coating delaminated at an unacceptably high rate on the
outside, interconnecting edges.
(8) Some of the interior materials were inadequate and the connection
equipment was not built into the shelters. Therefore, if this
equipment were lost in transit, expansion capability would be lost.
D, MARINE CORPS ENVIRONMENT-CONTROLLED MEDICAL SYSTEMS
The planners field tested the MCEMS shelter systems, and an analysis
of the required site preparation and development revealed that this system
also was not adequate for the Navy's requirements. The MCEMS shelters
were mainly designed to house personnel in the field. Following are
some of the major disadvantages that precluded adoption of the MCEM system.
(1) The rigid shelters could not be interconnected as operating manuals
indicated.
(2) Interconnection of the RCPS's left gaps between connecting surfaces.
This constituted an unsuitable condition for most of the patient
treatment areas.
(3) Some of the shelters were not ISO configured.
(4) The overhead area of some shelters was hindered by a large connecting
beam and precludes ISO configuration.
(5) Cost of the shelters had risen to the point where a "3:1 ISO
container is less costly.
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(6) The construction site for these shelters must be relatively level.
At some of the field test sites, the ground had to be physically
leveled,
(7) As with the MUST system, the heating unit delivered heat to each
appropriate unit, but air distribution within many of the shelters
was inadequate.
(8) Fiberglass coating delaminated at an unaccepably high rate on the
outside interconnecting corners.
(9) Again as with the MUST, the connection equipment was not built into
the shelters, and if lost in transit, expansion capability was lost.
E. MODULAR AIR TRANSPORTABLE HOSPITAL
The MATH shelters are designed for lift by C-130 aircraft, and are not
ISO configured. In general, the MATH is designed to be a fly-away medical
unit, providing emergency lifesaving care in the absence of other facilities
The MATH system is in no way designed for the provision of definitive care
and follow-on treatment. Therefore it is not adequate for the Navy's
needs. Since the uniqueness of the design of the MATH system makes it
unsuitable for use in a Fleet Hospital, the planners did not give it any
further consideration.
F. SUMMARY
After consideration of various existing deployable hospital systems,
the FHS planners concluded that no single shelter type was sufficient or
suitable for all purposes in the Fleet Hospital. This was because the
systems examined could not satisfy time requirements, or were simply
not designed for (or convertible to) the Navy's requirements.
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VI. PRESENT AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN THE FLEET HOSPITAL SUPPORT PROGRAM
The previous chapters have been devoted to establishing the foundation
from which the Fleet Hospital Support Program began and are primarily an
historical review. This chapter will address problems that the authors
consider to be either hampering the FHSP effort now, or with which the
program will be confronted in the future.
The casualty flow data were generated, and the decision was made to
field semi-standardized hospital core facilities, ranging in capacity
from 250-bed to 1000-bed units. The number of units committed during
contingencies would be dependent on projections or actual casualties as
time allows.
Although the FHS planners considered various configurations for the
Fleet Hospitals in the context of differing contingency scenarios, it is
impossible to foresee all barriers to the realization of a final product
with the flexibility that is necessary to fulfill the Navy's needs.
The following paragraphs will address critical present and potential
problem areas in the Fleet Hospital Support Program. The authors' efforts
in reviewing the alternatives considered were to bring to light some of
the advantages, disadvantages and conflicting aspects of the programs
considered to date. The authors hope that their consideration of these





The desired product of the Fleet Hospital Support Program is a trans-
portable, rapidly erectable, technologically advanced, definitive care
facility. The long-range plan is to develop a floating DCF, while the
short-range plan is to develop a land-based DCF, The floating DCF would
be operational upon arrival in waters adjacent to the contingency area.
The land-based DCF would be marginally operational within 15 days, and
fully operational within 30 days. The land-based DCF also would be
adaptable to the floating DCF. [Ref, 13]
B. METHODS
Alternatives to meet the desired output product were developed and
considered. They were dedicated hospital ships (discarded as too costly)
and the alternatives to dedicated hospital ships (highlighted in the
ADHOS Study and still under consideration by BUMED planners). An additional
alternative, hospital aboard barges, is being considered in a separate
study, and appears most promising.
The land-based DCF also had a series of alternatives reviewed against
the desired output criteria. Although there is yet to be a decision on
which floating platform is to be selected, the land-based DCF structures
were selected, primarily a combination to meet the differing criteria
within the total DCF complex.
C. RESOURCES
Resources include two major categories, those resources committed to
the study and development of the DCF's, and those resources to be committed
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when the development phase is completed. These will be addressed
separately to avoid confusion.
1
.
Study and Development Resources
These resources include the personnel committed to developing
the concept, those who will test and evaluate it, those who will monitor,
and those who provide input and evaluate the results. There are also
the fiscal and physical resources involved in this effort.
2. Util ization/Maintenance Resources
Utilization/maintenance resources include all the personnel who
will work within the DCF, those who will support it, and those who will
be involved in aspects of maintaining it while in a storage state,
shipping it, and erecting it. And it also includes the fiscal and
physical resources involved in this process.
D. THE OUTPUT-METHODS-RESOURCE PROCESS IN PERSPECTIVE
The outputs, methods, and resources are not isolated, discrete
functions. The desired output determines the feasible alternatives, and
the resources determine the acceptable alternative or method for obtaining
the output. The Fleet Hospital Program is experiencing problems in each
of these areas.' Consequently, the milestones presented in Chapter V have
slipped significantly, and are presently being rewritten.
E. THE FINAL PRODUCT—STUDY AND DEVELOPMENT
The responsibilities reviewed in Chapter V have, as a common theme,
the development of support and implementation plans for the selected
alternative. This presupposed the alternative selected would be
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reasonably static by mid-1980. But the selected product, a combination
of configurations, has not materialized. The authors were informed this
week that costs for the 500-bed hospital equipment had been refigured,
and would exceed $8 million, driving the total costs to the point ISO
containers would exceed cost constraints, and would only be used for a
fraction of the original intent. This heralds further setback in the
milestone projections. The authors consider this inevitable in view of
some of the criteria used and resources committed at the beginning of
the Fleet Hospital Support Program.
1 . Definitive Care
The original concept of a definitive care facility may be over-
ambitious for the land-based facility, and perhaps even for the floating
facility. Both the ADHOS Study and the NDCP highlighted the fact that
the majority of casualties would be evacuated. The evacuation time,
depending on the JCS time criteria, is expected to range from 15 to 60
days. It is possible the drive to create a definitive care facility
exceeds the requirement to support contingency medical needs, and this
concept could be downgraded to a philosophy of a surgically intensive
facility oriented towards a life-saving stabilization. The probability
of returning major surgery patients to duty within 30 days is marginal
at best. If the admissions rate approaches the 200 per day level, all
of the capability of the Fleet Hospital would be relegated to this role,
and the peripheral definitive care applications would be over-ridden by




It was the 'JCS evacuation policy' that served as a bench-mark
for evaluating the number of beds/operating rooms required, along with
the potential admissions rate. Although not privy to the JCS discussions,
the authors can project some of the decision criteria used.
a. Host-Nation Facilities
The capability and willingness of host nations in or near the
casualty area will be used to the extent available. Host nations facili-
ties, like United States medical facilities, are already overcommitted,
but during emergencies, many nations contribute medical personnel and
suppl ieSo
b. Other Armed Services
Both the United States and some of its allies maintain
military medical facilities, both fixed and mobile. Army and Air Force
medical facilities would be analyzed to determine their capacity.
Casualties are generally routed to the nearest medical facility, . ^ ..
regardless of Service,
c. Line of Communication (LOC)
The geographical location of the contingency will determine
the length of the supporting pipeline. Primarily, the flow of assets into
a theater of operations is one-way, with wery little returning from there
to rhe supporting theater(s). If the travel distance is short (measured
in terms of transport time/mode) life-saving and stabilization of casual-




In addition to the above considerations, mostly physical,
there is the philosophical consideration that goes beyond the physical
capacity of casualties returning to duty, or remaining in the COMMZ for
recuperation,. It is entirely possible that casualties sustaining
significant injuries may be evacuated for their convalescence, not only
to lessen the load for in-theater medical facilities, but to lessen the
psychological impact of having been wounded.
It would appear the more cogent argument is not the JCS
determination of evacuation policy that drives the medical support, but
rather the medical support available that forces the JCS decision.
3. Environmental Operating Range
A significant operating range of temperatures, -30°F to 120°F,
may be not only over-restrictive, but also inadequate. If based on the
European scenario, -10°F to 95°F would fit virtually all of the central
land mass of Western Europe. If figured on a global scenario, the
temperature parameters do not even fit the extremes found in the United
States, It is not uncommon for Fairbanks, Alaska to experience weeks
when the temperature reaches below -60°F, and the great deserts of the
Southwest reportedly exceed 120°F on some of the hotter days. If the
intent of the selected temperature ranges are to operate in extreme
cold or heat, it may be considerably more economical to either develop





It is a general premise that the more sophisticated and technolo-
gically advanced our equipment becomes, the more difficult it is to
maintain and repair, the more sensitive it becomes to the environment,
and the more precise becomes the power source requirements. While
mobility and reliability are not mutually exclusive, they can certainly
not be considered complementary, at least not in the case of most of the
shelf-type medical machinery being utilized in modern medical facilities.
The preliminary test results from Twentynine Palms and Bridgeport,
California, the hot and cold test sites, are replete with examples that
substantiate the problems that can be expected in the future. While it
could be argued that this was expected in the initial test phase of such
an extensive project, there are some more telling arguments. [Ref. 14]
a. The medical and support medical equipment were stored for
only a relatively short period of time,
b. The equipment was transported an insignificant distance with
virtually no inter-modal transfer.
c. Less than half of a 500-bed hospital core medical facility
was tested.
d. Comprehensive tests were not conducted under simulated
conditions, i.e., around-the-clock, emergency power source.
60 The emphasis during both tests was on efficiency and design,
not on speed of erection,
5o Adaptable to Floating Facility
While incorporated into the original design concept, this criterion
has no chance of being incorporated. There is no possibility of adapting
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the land-based facility to the floating facility by design, because the
determination of the floating platform has not been done. It can be
predicted, therefore, that the land-based configuration may be the
determining factor in the ADHOS alternative selection, at best. In the
worst case, it is possible they could be virtually incompatible.
6. Commitment of Resources
It is not an overstatement to suggest that the Fleet Hospital
Support Program is the most visible, volatile, and important initiative
the Navy Bureau of Medicine has undertaken in the past several decades.
It could naturally be expected the resources committed to the FHSP would
be monumental, both in dollars and in personnel /effort. While a great
deal of effort has been obviously expended, the dollars and personnel
do not appear to reinforce such a perception. A review of Chapter V
shows the Fleet Hospital Support Office as the central clearing-house
and hands-on manager. As a third-echelon command under the cognizance
of NAVFAC, they are intimately involved in both the program design and
the test of the various facilities/equipment. Additionally, the agencies
with which they must communicate are far from the actual project. The
communication and coordination requirements are, of themselves, astro-
nomical. At the end of the cold-weather test in Winter 80-81, the FHSO
moved from Port Hueneme to Alameda, California, While this riiove may add
to the long-range efficiency of the FHSO, it has disrupted the current
test and evaluation process. Virtually no modifications have resulted
from the Winter test due to this relocation. The authors consider the
staffing of the FHSO far short of what is necessary, even if all the
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billets were filled. But many of the billets are vacant, and some
critical billets were filled since the move to Alameda. A copy of the
FHSO structure chart is provided in Figure 2, Funding constraints and
the pressure to field the DCF as soon as possible have resulted in
incomplete testing, lack of important equipment, and no time to correct
shortcomings between the first and second test.
F, THE FINAL PRODUCT— UTILIZATION/MAINTENANCE
Once the final product is developed and fielded, significant problems
will be encountered. Many of these are being addressed now, but if
sufficient emphasis is not placed on the future operational employment,
there will be no hope of having the land-based DCF functioning in the
required time frame. As the final product changes in design, so must
the operational support factors/plans. Many of the original plans were
based on having a self-contained, ISO-configured core. The recent change
to the knock-down structures will have significant impact on virtually
eyery aspect of the PHST, for example.
1 . Packaging
With self-contained, ISO-configured containers much of the core
operating requirement is shipped in protected shelters, reducing the
total shipping cube substantially. Those items that are not ISO-configured
must be reduced to dimensions sufficient to fit within these containers.
And for every reduced configuration, there is a requirement on the other







































The more handling required in the process of getting the hospitals
from initial construction/production, the more damage will be incurred
to the shelters and the medical /support medical equipment. Every item
not in a self-contained ship/use container will require multiple handling.
This adds to materials handling equipment, space and time .requirements.
3. Storage
Unless the hospitals are prepositioned in the theaters where they
expect to be utilized, or more specifically, to the exact sites where
they will be utilized, they will have to be stored in warehouses, or
similar structures. While this does not apply to all the facilities/equip-
ment, it applies to a lot of it. If self-contained shelters are
eliminated, the items that are reduced and shipped in containers must be
off-loaded at the preposition site, unless the Navy is willing to buy
these containers to use as storage assets. If this is the case, it is
an expensive type storage, and may lead to re-consideration of the
self-contained concept. If this is not the case, more time and effort
will be expended getting containers to the preposition storage site,
and then loading then. Storage in itself presents a problem. Those
hospitals destined for rapid, short-notice utilization will have to be
stored in a minimum packaged configuration, which requires constant
monitoring during the storage period. This increases the number of
personnel necessary to maintain the prepositioned Fleet Hospitals, as
well as more room in which to operate. Periodic test and calibration
will also require more time and effort, even though virtually every
piece of sophisticated equipment will require testing and recalibrating
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after shipment to the operational site. It has also been recognized
that much of the medical supplies and equipment will not have the
necessary shelf-life for prepositioned storage, to include virtually
all medications, oxygen, and fuel. This is a separate issue receiving
attention at BUMED,
4. Transportation
A 500- or 1000-bed Fleet Hospital is not shipped in 20 or 30
containers, but in hundreds of containers. The oxygen alone is expected
to weigh over one million pounds. Such weight makes air deployabil i ty
unrealistic, forcing consideration of surface transport the only viable
alternative, i.e., rail, highway, barge, or containership. Break-bulk
shipping can not be considered due to the excessive load/unload time
required, and the virtual non-existence of break-bulk shipping ports.
The Defense Transportation System is already programmed beyond its
capacity for any significant contingency. Idle assets are not available
to accommodate the massive shipping requirements of the Fleet Hospitals,
and it will take time to divert existing assets from their current
operations to the preposition sites. These diversions will be prioritized
by JCS-level plans, most of which are set to occur automatically upon
notification. Only in a slowly escalating scenario will the medical
support facilities fit into the transportation priorities, that is,
unless strong political measures are instituted. These authors are
intimately familiar with the DTS, and in particular the role of the
transportation system in Europe. It is infinitely detailed and programmed,
and any unprogrammed requirements of magnitude will create significant




The Naval Construction Force (NCF) received plaudits for their
efforts during the tests of the land-based DCF's. Using an entire
SEABEE Battalion, they prepared the site in less time than was antici-
pated, and were extremely responsive to the fluctuating requirements of
erecting a complex installation evolving in concept. Some of the lessons
learned from these experiences served as warning for the future deploy-
ment of the hospitals. It took more site preparation than was originally
anticipated, and the success of the erection phase will hinge on the
prior hands-on practice of the SEABEES, as well as a definite plan for
the positioning and timing of all the facilities by time-phased priority.
An excerpt from the 22 Sep 81 letter from NAVFAC to Fleet Hospital
Project Office illuminates the problem: [Ref. 15]
"To erect the hospital in the minimum time and with the optimum
expenditure of manpower and equipment it is essential that the
erection crews practice erecting units that are the same as those that
comprise the hospital ,, oExperience at Twentynine Palms and Bridgeport
has shown that careful planning and scheduling of the construction
equipment operations is essential ,„. The work area is confined and the
size and weight of the components require the use of cranes and rough
terrain forkl ifts.
.
.The erection phase must be as finely choreographed
as the plays for any professional football team; practice on erection
and systems coordination is probably more important than individual
skills.,."
In addition to the practice and planning for each hospital, the
minimum force to erect each hospital is a dedicated SEABEE Battalion,
Their arriving at the erection site presupposes they have no other
mission, and that there are sufficient SEABEE Battalions, and the
necessary equipment in them, to do the ground preparation and erect the
facilities. Both of these assumptions dire highly suspect.
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If it is assumed the erection crews are available, and the land
upon which to place the hospitals has been acquired, there remains only
the task of erecting them, along with the necessary utilities. This will
be a marginal proposition with ISO-configured, self-contained shelters.
The authors of this paper are willing to go on record as saying it will
not be possible with most of the cargo arriving at the erection site in
knock-down shelter configuration to have the core medical facility
operational within 15 days of alert notification, or to have the full
facility operational within 30 days of notification,
6, Staffing
All of the active duty services, and the reserves, are experiencing
problems with acquiring and maintaining specialized medical and support
medical personnel, [Ref. 16] All of the Fleet Hospital support concepts
hinge on a drawdown/mobilization of Stateside personnel. While this is
at present the only short-term source of assets, it will not suffice as
a doctrinal concept. The best projections show over 50?o of surgical
cases being evacuated to these same facilities that are giving up personnel
to mobilization roles, BUMED cannot entice sufficient specialized
personnel. This is an issue that must be resolved at National level,
either through a mobilization designee, or a conscription process,
G. SUMMARY
The Fleet Hospital concept is viable and necessary. While this
chapter has emphasized the problems being encountered, they are intended
to illuminate causes, rather than find fault or place blame. What origin-
ated as a two-tiered concept, land-based DCF adaptable to the long-range
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floating DCF, is beginning to disintegrate from a lack of resources.
There are many dedicated servicemembers and civilians dedicating themselves
to making this program work, in spite of the obstacles with which they
are confronted, but they have too little time, not enough people or
money. Chapter VII will address those actions the authors suggest to
change the current trend.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has served to place the Fleet Hospital Support Program in
perspective, drawing together pieces of a total concept into one document,
But it has also served to illuminate problems being encountered today
that can not help but lead to larger problems in the future. There is no
doubt that the facilities requirements for a relocatable definitive care
facility are not clear. The Fleet Hospital Support concept began as a
vision. .,a vision of a modern, technologically advanced, medical facility
capable of being transported to any location in the world where our
Servicemembers might require surgically intensive medical treatment. But
turning visions into reality is not an easy task. The development, or
test and evaluation, of the Fleet Hospital has become a monumental task,
far-reaching in scope and impact. If the authors were challenged to
make one single recommendation, it would be a recommendation to make this
a Department of Defense project, with an intensive research and develop-
ment effort an essential part. The Fleet Hospital that is eventually
fielded should be the prototype for all of our Armed Services. It is
the authors' opinions that the Fleet Hospital could be fielded faster,
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and would be a much better product if the resources of the Department of
Defense were added to those resources the Navy has already committed.
The remainder of this chapter lists and explains the series of actions
the authors recommend for adoption by the Fleet Hospital Support Program
planners to minimize the cost of continuing the program,
A. FREEZE THE TEST AND EVALUATION PROCESS TEMPORARILY
Significant changes in the current allocation of funds and cost
projections for parts of the land-based Fleet Hospital have resulted in
recent decisions to modify the core facility, which may jeopardize the
ultimate deployabil ity and functional capability of the whole system.
Since no substantial modifications have taken place on the shelters
following tfre winter 80/81 test, the impact of a temporary freeze should
be negligible^ This freeze would be used to accomplish the actions
proposed in this chapter.
B. SELECT THE FLOATING HOSPITAL PLATFORM
An early consideration in the land-based OCF was its adaptability to
a floating DCF under the ADHOS concept. The medical equipment, and much
of the medical support equipment, will be usable in both the floating
and land-based configurations, but without knowing which alternative will
be chosan as the floating configuration, 3ubs~antial additional costs may
be incurred. ISO, self-contained shelters would adapt virtually intact
to barges, but would not be usable aboard other alternatives, such as
converted ships. By not considering adaptability as a significant decision
criteria in the land-based DCF design, millions of dollars may be
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needlessly expended. Using this argument, it becomes paramount to choose
the floating platform before continuing the test and evaluation of
land-based shelters.
C. RE-ESTABLISH LAND-BASED SHELTER CRITERIA
Key variables of the land-based DCF can be viewed as transportability,
erectabil ity, usability, reliability, maintainability, adaptability, and
costo Although cost is an important factor, it should not be the key
decision criterion to the detriment of the other DCF variables. Chapter
VI of this paper contains a discussion of the importance of these issues.
Coupled with the hands-on knowledge of the test and evaluation adminis-
trators, this chapter could serve to assist in re-evaluating the original
Fleet Hospital criteria. A rational approach would be to also prioritize
the criteria by degree of importance, and base trade-off decisions on
such a matrix.
D, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Part of the difficulty in the modification of the tested shelters has
been the lack of expertise on the ultimate use of the shelters and
associated medical equipment by the personnel doing the modifications.
The users, in this case medical, medical support, and specialized main-
tenance personnel, should play an integral role in this process, M. E,
Essoglou suggests the positive aspect 'linker' personnel add to product
acceptabil ity/credibil ity when used as intermediaries between 'knowledge
suppliers' and 'knowledge users.' [Ref. 17] Although he is discussing
technology transfer in the context of Research and Development, the point
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has validity in the Fleet Hospital Support Program, The test reports
from Twentynine Palms and Bridgeport indicate many shortcomings that
might have been avoided had physicians, nurses and medical maintenance
technicians been present during the alteration phase. While there was
no single problem of significance, the combination of many small problems
noted in the test results presages an extensive modification effort.
The use of technology transfer fundamentals and user personnel in 'linker'
roles would have saved much of this effort, not to mention time and money.
E. FUNDING
Resource allocation, particularly personnel resources, should be
reviewed acknowledging the critical ity of the test and evaluation phase
of the Fleet Hospital Support Program. Shortfalls in subject areas as
well as in total manpower dedicated to the 'development stage' appear
far short of the requirements,, If insufficient money is apportioned early,
there will be problems in each of the subsequent hospitals delivered to
the field for use. The prototype configuration tested at Twentynine
Palms was tested at Bridgeport before many modifications could take
place, and the test results are replete with the comment 'same as at
Twentynine Palms,' or words to that effect. The Navy is saving millions
of dollars by going d-^rectly to test and evaluation without the benefit
of Research and Development. The lack of funding may make this more
expensive in the long run. A few beds that arrive when needed seems
infinitely more worthwhile than thousands of beds arriving too late.
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Fo CRITICAL PATH METHOD OF PROJECT DESIGN
The critical path method is a technique used by program managers to
sequence events in a project according to the order in which they must
be accomplished, and attributing the expected process time to each of the
events. It assumes certain events must be completed before others can
begin. When all events are charted according to their necessary sequence,
the longest consecutive chain of events is used to describe the 'critical
path.' [Ref. 18] If the milestone table for the Fleet Hospital Support
Program is redeveloped using the Critical Path Mathod, it would serve to
emphasize the order in which events must occur and provide a more relia-
ble estimate of when the Fleet Hospitals can be expected for utilization.
G. RESUMPTION OF TEST AND EVALUATION
Once those items presented in paragraph B through F (above) have been
completed, the test and evaluation phase should continue, targeted at
early identification of the core configuration of the land-based DCF,
This core configuration should remain stable to the maximum possible
extent, for most of the program is dedicated to plans supporting the
core of the DCF.
H. CONCLUSION
The Fleet Hospital Support Program originated in response to a serious
shortfall in the Navy's ability to meet its primary medical support
mission. Unless substantial alterations in the present thrust of the
program are made, it is highly improbable the land-based DCF portion will
meet its intended operational purpose. The efforts and resources already
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expended have not been wasted, but without reorientation/revital ization
they will fall far short of their potential. The authors hope this
paper can serve not only as an objective view of the pieces of the Fleet
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